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Abstract
Emerging market countries that have improved institutions and attained inter-
mediate levels of institutional quality have experienced severe financial crises fol-
lowing capital flow reversals. However, there is also evidence that countries with
strong institutions and deep capital markets are less affected by external shocks.
We reconcile these two observations using a calibrated DSGE model that extends
the financial accelerator framework developed in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999). The model captures financial market institutional quality with creditors.
ability to recover assets from bankrupt firms. Bankruptcy costs affect vulnerabil-
ity to sudden stops directly but also indirectly by affecting the degree of liabil-
ity dollarization. Simulations reveal an inverted U-shaped relationship between
bankruptcy recovery rates and the output loss following sudden stops. We provide
empirical evidence that this non-linear relationship exists.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: E44; F31; F41
Keywords: sudden stops, bankruptcy costs, financial accelerator, liability dol-
larization.
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1. Introduction  
 Good institutions should reduce both the probability of sudden stops and the cost 
associated with them.  First, better institutions that regulate and supervise the banking system 
improve credit allocation, which should reduce the probability of a large capital flow reversal.  
Second, lack of transparency has been shown to be correlated with herding behavior by 
international investors (Prasad et al., 2004).  In addition, corruption has been negatively linked to 
the share of foreign direct investment in inflows, a more stable source of funding (Wei and Wu, 
2002).  Finally, stronger institutions spur domestic financial sector development, which allows 
firms to borrow in local currency (Burger and Warnock, 2006).  This reduces liability 
dollarization, which has been shown to increase the output loss following a sudden stop (Cavallo, 
2004; Guidotti et al., 2004).  However, many emerging market countries that have attained 
intermediate levels of institutional quality have experienced severe financial crises following 
capital flow reversals.  Honig (2008a) finds that countries with moderate levels of institutional 
quality experience more frequent recessionary sudden stops.  Ranciere et al. (2008) find that the 
link between negative credit skewness and growth is strongest in the set of financially liberalized 
countries with a medium degree of contract enforceability.   
 In this paper, we present a model showing that improved governance can in some cases 
increase the cost of a sudden stop.  Our measure of institutional quality is a bankruptcy recovery 
rate, which is a key parameter in the financial accelerator framework developed by Bernanke, 
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) (hereafter BGG).   The model includes a contract between foreign 
creditors and domestic entrepreneurs.  According to this contract, as entrepreneurs borrow more 
for a given level of net worth, they are charged a higher interest rate on their loans. The financial 
imperfection that generates this external finance premium is the result of a cost that lenders must 
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incur when borrowers default in order to observe and retrieve borrowers’ realized returns.  
Lenders pay this amount only when firms default on their loans; otherwise lenders receive a 
fixed payment.  We can therefore interpret this cost as a cost of bankruptcy that reflects auditing, 
accounting, and legal expenditures associated with liquidation (Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1997).  
The lower the bankruptcy cost, the greater the proportion of a firm’s value that creditors can 
recover from a firm that is unable to repay the full amount of the loan; i.e. the greater the 
recovery rate.   
 We claim that this bankruptcy cost, and therefore, the recovery rate in the standard 
financial accelerator model is a reflection of institutional quality.  First, countries with strong 
legal systems that protect creditor rights and provide an orderly bankruptcy process should have 
lower bankruptcy costs.  Second, given that a firm has declared bankruptcy, prudential regulation 
and supervision of the financial system that requires disclosure and transparency of firms’ 
financial positions should also reduce these costs.   
          In contrast to BGG and later work that extends the financial accelerator framework to an 
open economy setting (Choi and Cook, 2003; Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci, 2007, hereafter 
GGN), we calibrate our model to different levels of bankruptcy costs.  We then analyze the effect 
of an exogenous increase in foreign interest rates, which initiates a sudden stop.  There are two 
direct effects of an increase in the recovery rate.  First, a higher recovery rate lowers the level of 
financial frictions due to asymmetric information. This effect causes a more muted output 
response to external shocks.  Second, when financial frictions are lower, we show that borrowing 
costs are less sensitive to leverage.  Therefore, when there is a sudden stop and borrowing costs 
increase, firms must respond by decreasing investment significantly.  This effect amplifies the 
response of output. 
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 We use the framework to model two types of economies.  We first analyze our 
benchmark economy that is characterized by the ability of domestic firms to obtain finance in 
local currency.  In this economy, the first effect dominates, and a reduction in bankruptcy costs 
reduces vulnerability to sudden stops.  We then look an economy in which domestic firms must 
borrow in foreign currency.  In this case, we find the opposite result that lower bankruptcy costs 
actually increase the output loss following a sudden stop.  Specifically, liability dollarization and 
the depreciation of the currency strengthens the second effect, leading to a larger drop in output.   
Finally, we look at the more realistic intermediate case in which some firms borrow in 
local currency and others borrow in dollars.  In contrast to GGN (2007) and Choi and Cook 
(2003) in which all borrowing is denominated in a single currency, we make liability 
dollarization endogenous.  Specifically, we model a causal relationship between institutional 
quality, captured by bankruptcy costs, and the degree to which firms borrow in local currency.  
This link has been proposed before.  Burger and Warnock (2006) provide empirical evidence that 
institutional quality affects the development of the domestic financial system.  This allows 
domestic firms to obtain sufficient funds from domestic lenders so that they are not forced to 
borrow from abroad.  They therefore do not have foreign currency-denominated liabilities on 
their balance sheets.1  To model this relationship, we assume that there is a fixed wedge between 
recovery rates for domestic lenders and foreign lenders (c.f. Iacoviello, Minetti, 2006; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1998; Hermalin and Rose, 1999).  In this case, an increase in the recovery rate 
stimulates domestic lending, assumed to be in local currency, more than foreign lending, 
reducing the share of dollar liabilities.      
                                                 
1 Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003) show that if domestic financial markets are underdeveloped, firms will have excessive 
dollar liabilities.   
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Simulations reveal an inverted U-shaped relationship between institutional quality and 
vulnerability to sudden stops.  In particular, an improvement in government quality increases the 
output loss following a sudden stop, but this effect only applies to countries that start with low 
levels of government quality.  Finally, we provide empirical evidence that this non-linear 
relationship exists.  This result is consistent with recent models (e.g. Schneider and Tornell, 2004; 
Ranciere et al, 2008) showing that countries with intermediate levels of institutional quality that 
are characterized by limited contract enforcement and bailout guarantees are more likely to 
experience sudden stops.  Aghion et al., (2004) present a model showing that countries with 
intermediate levels of financial development experience the most instability as a result of 
financial liberalization.  Our paper adds to this literature by describing the dynamic behavior of 
vulnerability to sudden stops as countries transition from low to high institutional quality 
economies.   
 Thus we focus on the impact of a capital flow reversal.  The initial outflow is exogenous 
and caused by a rise in foreign interest rates.  Certainly a rise in U.S. real interest rates played a 
large role in the Latin American debt crisis.  Of course sudden stops are also caused by domestic 
factors.  We do not address this aspect of sudden stops in our paper.  Instead, we endogenize the 
effect of a foreign interest rate shock on the financial system and the magnitude of the resulting 
capital outflow.  Our work complements the literature on the role of credit frictions in amplifying 
the response of output during sudden stops (e.g. Arellano and Mendoza, 2002; Mendoza and 
Smith, 2006; Mendoza, 2006a & b; Chari et. al, 2005; Neumeyer and Perri, 2005).  We provide 
further insight by showing that the relationship between the financial frictions and vulnerability 
to sudden stops is not always positive and depends on the initial level of institutional quality.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 presents and calibrates the model.  
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We then simulate sudden stop-induced output drops for different values of the recovery rate 
parameter.  Section 3 provides empirical evidence that, at least in a certain range, a decline in 
bankruptcy costs can increase the output loss following sudden stops.  Section 4 concludes.   
2. Model Economy   
 In this section, we build a model to analyze the relationship between institutional quality 
and vulnerability to sudden stops. The financial accelerator framework of BGG in an open 
economy setting is well suited for this purpose.  First, the model includes bankruptcy costs that 
can proxy for institutional quality.  Second, institutional quality through a financial contract 
determines the leverage of domestic firms. These balance sheet effects in turn determine how 
vulnerable a country is to sudden stops.  Third, the general equilibrium framework together with 
reasonable calibration allows us to quantify the vulnerability to sudden stops.  Finally, unlike the 
standard RBC model, the financial accelerator mechanism replicates the high amplitude of the 
output response to shocks observed in the data.   
2.1. Benchmark Model (No Liability Dollarization) 
There are six types of agents in the benchmark economy: households, entrepreneurs, a 
domestic bank, retailers, capital producers, and a central bank. Households work, consume, and 
invest in deposits denominated in domestic and foreign currency that have a riskless rate of 
return. Entrepreneurs are risk neutral, and borrow from domestic banks to finance the production 
of wholesale goods. A domestic bank finances entrepreneurs using the deposits of consumers.2 
Retailers are monopolistically competitive and transform wholesale goods into final consumption 
goods. Retailers are included to simplify the financial contract and motivate price stickiness. 
Capital producers turn investment into capital goods. Finally, a central bank conducts monetary 
                                                 
2  Funding does not have to come exclusively from domestic sources.  But we assume in this section that all financing is 
denominated in local currency. 
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policy using a Taylor (1993) rule. Aside from the financial contract, the rest of the economy 
follows a standard dynamic New-Keynesian small open economy framework.  Details of the 
economy are deferred to Appendix A. In this section, we focus on the financial contract. 
 The Contract between the Domestic Bank and Entrepreneurs 
 There is a continuum of entrepreneurs with insufficient net worth to internally finance 
their investments. Entrepreneurs borrow the difference between their desired investment and net 
worth from a domestic bank. The external finance premium is determined according to the 
contract with the bank.  Entrepreneurs’ return on investment is subject to an idiosyncratic shock.  
( )[ ] ( ) ittitA ittktititittit BRAFKQRABxRAF it =⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡−++− ∫ − δµ 0 1)1()(1                                                           (2.1) 
where, itA  is the idiosyncratic shock to returns to capital and is log normally, i.i.d. itA  is the 
expected cutoff value of the firm specific shock below which the firm is unable to pay back its 
debt. itx , µ , 1tQ − , itK , and tR  represent the external finance premium, bankruptcy cost 
coefficient, price of capital, capital stock, and the risk free rate respectively.  The recovery rate is 
given by 1-µ.  Equation (2.1) shows that banks set their expected returns equal to the risk free 
rate. The right hand side represents the opportunity costs of financing the entrepreneur. Expected 
returns consist of the principal and interest payments with probability ( )1 itF A−  and whatever 
the firm has if it defaults net of bankruptcy costs.  Funds borrowed from the bank, itB , and the 
return to capital, ktR , are given by:  
itittit NKQB −= −1                (2.2) 
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where itN  and 1t itQ K−  are the net worth and the desired investment of entrepreneur i respectively, 
and wtt PP /  is the markup of retail goods over whole sale goods. We assume that entrepreneurs 
purchase their entire capital stock every period. This assumption ensures that the external finance 
premium is determined based on the overall leverage of the firm and not just the marginal 
investment.  The second equation that characterizes the contract is as follows: 
( ) itittittktit BxRKQRA +=−1                                                    (2.4) 
Entrepreneurs need at least the cutoff value of the idiosyncratic shock to pay the principal and 
interest. itA  and the risk premium, itx , are determined simultaneously using equations (2.1) and 
(2.2).  Entrepreneurs in the model are assumed to be risk neutral and are exposed to both 
idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Therefore, technology-related risks are transferred from risk-
averse domestic consumers to the entrepreneurs via the financial intermediary. 3  From the 
revenue maximization problem of the entrepreneur, subject to (2.1), we derive:4  
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Equation (2.5) represents the supply of capital relation.  When firms become more leveraged, 
banks charge a higher premium to compensate for the higher probability of default. Similarly, we 
can show by inverting (2.5) that leverage is positively related to the relative returns to capital. 
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 The overall demand for capital is obtained by aggregating over all entrepreneurs.  
                                                 
3 Assuming that the country is exposed to an adverse aggregate shock, the standard financial accelerator framework implies that 
the bank collects more from entrepreneurs that survive to compensate for the losses from bad loans. A more realistic contract in 
which foreign banks include the expected, instead of the ex post, returns to capital in the financial contract does not change the 
results. Proof is available on http://homepages.uconn.edu/~ula06001/. 
4 The derivation of this relationship is provided in BGG. 
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( )( ) ttktttt NRREKQ /11 −− =ϕ               (2.7) 
According to this relation, firms base their investment decisions on the expected returns to 
capital relative to the risk free rate. Furthermore, we can also show that in steady state higher 
bankruptcy costs correspond to lower leverage so that 0)(' >µϕ .5 The entrepreneurs’ net worth 
evolves according to the following: 
t
e
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where t
e
t PW / , itV  are an entrepreneur’s real wage and equity. itV is given by,  
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The first term on the right hand side of equation (2.9) represents the returns to capital given that 
the firm does not go bankrupt. The second term is the expected debt payment. eγ in equation (2.8) 
is the survival probability of the entrepreneur. This variable is needed to prevent entrepreneurs 
from building up enough net worth and becoming self sufficient.6 Net worth is composed of the 
net returns to capital if the firm stays afloat and real wages.  Equations (2.8) and (2.9) define the 
second part of the financial accelerator mechanism. In particular, if there is an increase in asset 
prices, returns to capital along with firms’ net worth increases as well.7 If entrepreneurs do not 
survive, they consume the returns to capital net of debt payments such that ( )1e eit itC Vγ= − . 
2.2. Parameterization 
                                                 
5 Proof is available upon request. 
6 Because internal finance is cheaper, there is an incentive to be self sufficient.  
7 Equation (2.9) can be used to show that / 0t tdV dQ > . 
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 When possible, we calibrate the model to Brazil.  Brazil was chosen due to available data 
used to calibrate most of the parameters.  When Brazilian data are not available, we choose 
parameter values used for emerging market countries or that are standard in the literature.   
Preferences and Technology 
 The quarterly discount factor β  is set to 0.961 to match the annual T-Bill rate of 17.14%. 
The coefficient of relative risk aversion is 2Ω = , which is standard in RBC models.8 Since 
imports are 20% of consumption, we set the share parameter,γ , equal to 0.8.  A significant 
number of studies assume that elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is equal 
to one in order to simplify the analysis of optimal monetary policy (c.f. Devereux and Engel, 
2003; Clarida et al, 2002).  However, empirical estimates of this parameter are usually greater 
than 1 and range between 5 and 6.9 These relatively higher values also explain the home bias for 
domestic goods. Therefore, we assume that 5ρ = .   
 The two commonly used values for labor supply elasticity in emerging markets are 1.4 
(Correia et al, 1995) and 2 (Mendoza, 1991). We follow the existing literature and choose the 
parameter κ in the utility function such that the labor supply elasticity is 2, and the average hours 
worked relative to the total hours available is 0.333. The habit persistence parameter b  is 
initially equal to 0.85. Empirical estimates of this parameter range from 0.8 (Fuhrer, 2000; 
Constantinides, 1990) to 0.95 (Campell and Cochrane, 1995; Lettau and Uhlig, 2000). Values 
within this range explain the equity premium puzzle and help replicate the hump shaped response 
to shocks observed in the data. We test the sensitivity of our results to habit formation in 
consumption by setting this parameter equal to zero.  
                                                 
8 We considered different values for Ω  in our sensitivity analysis including 1Ω = . Results did not change significantly. 
9 Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) find that the estimates range from 1.2 to 21.4. Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) argue that the 
range of values lie between 5 and 6. Adolfson et al (2007), using a Bayesian estimation technique, state  that values between 5 
and 6 are preferable. 
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 We follow Kanczuk (2004) and set the capital share parameter α equal to 0.41. We find 
that the quarterly depreciation rate δ equals 3.1% when we assume that the investment/output 
ratio is 16%. Using the conventional value of 2.5% did not change our results. significantly. 
 Empirical estimates of the elasticity of the price of capital with respect to the investment-
capital ratio lie between 20 (Woodford, 2003) and 2 (Chirinko, 1993). Despite amplifying real 
rigidities and replicating the hump shaped response observed in the data, higher values of this 
elasticity yield implausible costs of capital. In our benchmark model, we set this parameter equal 
to 2 following King and Wolman (1996). 
 As in Cespedes, Ochoa, and Soto (2005), we assume that the probability of an adjustment 
in retailer prices, 1 θ− , is 0.35. Basu and Fernald (1993) find that markup rates for the U.S. lie 
between 1.15 and 1.23. Based on this result, studies that include imperfect competition calibrate 
the markup rate to 1.2.  We could not find an empirical estimate of markups in Brazil. However, 
surveys of emerging market countries (e.g. Dobrinsky, Korosi, Markov and Halpern, 2006) 
suggest that 1.2η =  is a reasonable assumption.  Finally, we set the price elasticity of export 
demand, ε, and the elasticity of marginal depreciation with respect to the utilization rate, x, equal 
to 1, consistent with GGN.   
External Finance Premium 
 We calibrate the financial sector parameters to match the following: 1)_Annual business 
failure rate of 10%. 2)_ Difference between lending rate and the risk free rate equal to 260 basis 
point. 3)_ Leverage ratio, /QK N , equal to 2 or debt-net worth ratio of 1. In order to obtain 
these steady state values we fixed the bankruptcy cost coefficient to 0.5, the quarterly survival 
rate of entrepreneurs to 0.9728, and assumed that the idiosyncratic productivity variable itA  is 
log-normally distributed with a variance equal to 0.078 and a mean of unity.  
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 Most models of financial imperfections are calibrated to advanced countries. For example, 
the bankruptcy costs are chosen to be less than 30% of firm assets (e.g. Bernanke, Gertler and 
Gilchrist, 2000 use 12%; Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1997 use 20%).  According to the World Bank’s 
2008 Doing Business report, bankruptcy costs are much larger for emerging market countries.  
For example, the low recovery rate reported for Brazil (85.4%) implies that bankruptcy costs are 
approximately 3.9 times those in advanced economies (21.7%). Therefore, 0.5µ =  is a 
reasonable parameter value for Brazil. 
 We found evidence on the business failure rate for Brazil from a various sources. 
According to a survey conducted by Sebrae (Serviço Brasileiro de Apoio às Micro e Pequenas 
Empresas—Small Business Administration of Brazil) in 2004, Brazil has one of the highest 
business failure rates in the world and approximately half of the 470,000 small firms that open 
every year close down within two years. Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE, 
Statistics Office of Brazil) reports that more than 99% of the firms in Brazil are small. Using 
these observations and the fact that there are approximately 4.5 million businesses in 2004, a 
steady state business failure rate of roughly 10% (much higher than the 3% level used in models 
calibrated to advanced countries) is reasonably consistent with data.10   
 The only empirical study we found related to leverage in Brazil was by Agrawal and 
Mohadi (2004). The authors find using data from Worldscope and IFC, that the debt-equity ratio 
in Brazil between 1980 and 1997 averaged 1.01, implying a /QK N  of approximately 2 
consistent with our steady state leverage ratio. According to the “Lending Interest Rates and 
Bank Spreads” publication of Banco Central do Brazil, the average spread between lending and 
                                                 
10 Statistics announced by Office of Advocacy show that bankruptcy rates are approximately 2.3% for the U.S.  
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funding rates for the 2003-2006 period was equal to 28.5 % for corporations.  Therefore, the 
steady state interest rate premium in the model (26%) is not too different from data. 
 Finally, we set the exponents of inflation and output ( πγ , yγ , τ ) in the central bank’s 
policy rule equal to 2, 0.75, and 0 respectively, similar to Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2007). 
The authors argue that these parameter values provide a reasonable approximation to the 
behavior of interest rate in an emerging market country such as Korea. Nevertheless, there is 
evidence that the standard Taylor rule is not a good representation of monetary policy in Brazil 
(Kanczuk, 2004). We check the sensitivity to a different monetary policy rule later in the paper.  
2.3. Capital Reversals in the Benchmark Model 
 In this section we study the effects of capital reversals in two economies: a high 
institutional quality economy (HIQE) and a low institutional quality economy (LIQE). We 
simulate capital reversals with a positive shock to foreign interest rates.  We then compare the 
impulse responses obtained from the two economies.   
 We calibrate the LIQE to the benchmark parameter values discussed in Section 2.2.  For 
the HIQE, the only change we make is setting the bankruptcy cost coefficient to 0.2. This value 
falls within the reasonable range found for developed economies (albeit, closer to the lower end). 
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) argue that bankruptcy costs should be within the 0.2-0.36 range for 
a developed economy.  The new value of the bankruptcy cost coefficient, implies a leverage ratio 
of 3.8 and an interest rate spread of 15.8 percentage points. This compares with the values of 0.5, 
2, and 26 in the benchmark model, respectively. Therefore, the HIQE is characterized by lower 
bankruptcy costs, higher leverage, and a lower risk premium than the LIQE. 
 Next, we log-linearize our model and report the impulse responses to a 100 annualized 
basis points increase in foreign interest rates in the two economies. Figure 1 shows the results. In 
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both of the economies, a positive shock to foreign interest rates results in an increase in domestic 
interest rates and a depreciation of the currency.  The latter generates a rise in foreign goods’ 
prices and inflation.  The central bank responds by raising the interest rates.  Real interest rates 
increase due to price rigidities, and prompt a drop in output, consumption, and investment.  As 
asset prices decrease in response to a drop in investment, entrepreneurs’ net worth falls. This 
produces an increase in leverage, notwithstanding the drop in investment. The fall in investment 
also increases returns to capital, thus matching the increase in external finance premium. 
In addition, the amplitude of impulse responses in the LIQE is higher.  There are two 
counteracting effects that that determine this outcome.  First, when bankruptcy costs are low, the 
effect of the financial accelerator mechanism is more muted, and the output loss due to financial 
frictions is lower.  This can be seen more clearly if we consider the evolution of net worth shown 
in equation (2.8) and the aggregate resource constraint given by,  
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Moreover, small bankruptcy costs imply that entrepreneurs’ net worth falls by less, as can be 
seen from equation (2.9).  The smaller drop in net worth prevents a sharp increase in the external 
finance premium and a large decrease in investment. We refer to this combined effect as the 
financial accelerator effect.  The second effect is due to the nature of the financial contract and 
can be observed more clearly if we log-linearize (2.5) around a non-stochastic steady state:11 
( ) ~1~ , tit LEVAEFP µα=              (2.11) 
where   
~~
1
~~~~~
1 ,,0)(' ttttt
k
tt NKQLEVRREFP −+=−=> −µα  and the two variables denote percent 
deviations from steady state. In the HIQE, the external finance premium is less sensitive to 
                                                 
11 The expression for the coefficient of the leverage variable is available on http://homepages.uconn.edu/~ula06001/.  
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leverage ratios. Therefore, after the initial surge in leverage prompted by a drop in net worth, 
investment has to fall significantly in order to counteract the decrease in the wedge between the 
risk free interest rates and the returns to capital. Specifically, since the coefficient of the leverage 
variable in equation (2.11) is lower for the HIQE, investment has to fall by more in response to 
an increase in tR . The reason is that when bankruptcy costs are low, creditors are not as affected 
by bankruptcy since they can retrieve a greater portion of a bankrupt firm’s assets.  In this case, 
the risk free rate is a relatively more important determinant of external finance rates. In contrast, 
when bankruptcy costs are high, leverage plays a more predominant role. We refer to this effect 
as the leverage sensitivity effect. By changing bankruptcy costs, we uncover this feature of the 
model, which to this point has not been documented theoretically or empirically despite the 
sizeable literature on the financial accelerator effect.  There is a line of finance literature, 
however, (c.f. Collin–Dufresne, Goldstein, 2001; Tang, 2006) that reports a higher leverage ratio 
sensitivity of spreads for corporate bonds with lower credit ratings compared to bonds with high 
credit ratings. In the empirical section we provide evidence for the leverage sensitivity effect. 
 To summarize, we find that when borrowing is denominated in local currency, the 
financial accelerator effect dominates the leverage sensitivity effect.  In this case, the output 
response to capital reversals is more muted when institutional quality is higher.  These initial 
results are similar to studies (BGG and GGN) showing that output responses to various shocks 
are smaller when the financial accelerator effect is shut off (µ is set equal to zero).  
2.4. Complete Liability Dollarization 
In this section, we look at the case of an economy in which domestic entrepreneurs are 
assumed to rely exclusively on foreign financing, which is denominated in foreign currency.  
Introducing liability dollarization to the model affects only the part of the model pertaining to the 
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financial contract; the rest of the economy is the same.  By incorporating balance sheet effects, 
we obtain the opposite result from Section 2.3.  In particular, a reduction in bankruptcy costs 
increases an economy’s vulnerability to a capital reversal.   
In addition, having firms bypass the domestic banking sector and borrow from abroad 
also captures the growing rate of direct foreign borrowing observed in these countries. 12 
Moreover, in contrast to previous studies that analyze credit market imperfections in an open 
economy setting (Chue and Cook, 2004; Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci, 2007), introducing 
direct foreign borrowing allows us to derive the country default-risk premium endogenously.13   
 The terms of the contract are determined according to the equations below:  
( )[ ] ( ) ittrtitA ittktittitittit FRsAFKQRAFxRAF it *0 1* /)1()(1 =⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡−++− ∫ − δµ                                           (2.12) 
( ) itittrtittktit FxRsKQRA +=− *1 /                          (2.13)        
it
r
tititt FsNKQ =−−1                              (2.14) 
where rts ,
*
tR and itF  denote the real exchange rate, foreign risk free interest rate and nominal 
foreign borrowing respectively. The financial contract is different from that in the benchmark 
model in two ways. First, loans are denominated in dollars, and lenders equate their expected 
returns to the foreign interest rates.14  Second, the supply of capital relationship depends on the 
exchange rate.  Thus exchange rates directly impact the external finance premium. Given the 
terms of the contract, we can obtain the relationship between external finance premium and 
leverage in a similar fashion.15 
                                                 
12 See IMF’s GFSR and WEO for April 2007. 
13 The country risk premium is exogenous in GGN.  Chue, Cook (2003) use a bank-specific shock to derive the risk premium. 
14 In our model it is not important whether foreigners or domestic residents provide the foreign currency denominated funds. In 
either case the opportunity cost for the lender is the risk free foreign interest rate.  
15 The derivation is similar to that in BGG and is available upon request. 
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 As in the previous section, we calibrate this economy to high and low levels of 
bankruptcy costs and report the impulse responses to a 100 annualized basis point foreign 
interest rate shock.  Results are displayed in Figure 2.16   There are two main results. First, 
compared to the economy with no dollarization, the amplitudes of the responses are significantly 
higher for each level of institutional quality.  Second, the leverage sensitivity effect dominates 
the financial accelerator effect, so that the output response is greater when µ is lower.  This 
finding is exactly opposite to that in the previous section.  
 There are two factors that produce these different results. First, entrepreneurs’ net worth 
now includes foreign instead of domestic interest rates and exchange rates: 
( )⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ +−= −− ∫ itittkt
A
ititt
r
titt
k
tit AdFKQRAFRsKQRV
i
10
*
1 µ                       (2.16) 
This modification causes foreign interest rate shocks to be fully transmitted to entrepreneurs’ net 
worth in contrast to the previous section where part of the external shock was absorbed by 
exchange rates. Furthermore, the depreciating currency has a negative effect on net worth by 
inflating the domestic currency value of the firms’ loans. The larger negative impact on net 
worth causes a sharp increase in the external finance premium and a larger drop in investment 
following a sudden stop compared to the benchmark model.  
Second, the relationship between the external finance premium and leverage is different. 
This can be seen more clearly from the linearized version of equation (2.15): 
( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+= −
~
1
~~
1
~
* , rt
r
ttift ssLEVAEFP µα                                                                             (2.17) 
                                                 
16 The figure shows a large fall in investment.  Joyce and Nabar (2008) find empirically that for sudden stops to reduce 
investment, the banking system has to collapse following the withdrawal of funds by external depositors.    
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where   
~~~
1
~~
*
~~
*
1 ,0)(' ttttt
k
ttf NKQLEVRREFP −+=−=> −µα .  In contrast to the benchmark model, 
exchange rates have an impact on the relationship between leverage and the external finance 
premium.  Similarly, a capital reversal shrinks the wedge between the returns to capital and the 
risk free interest rates, prompting a drop in investment. However, investment falls by an 
additional amount to lower leverage and counteract the rise in foreign debt caused by the 
depreciation. Therefore, the drop in investment is more pronounced than in Section 2.3. 
 The second difference with a non-dollarized economy, which is more critical for our 
analysis, is that an increase in institutional quality produces a larger output drop.  As explained 
above, leverage sensitivity of the external finance premium is low when institutional quality is 
high (i.e., f1α  is smaller in a HIQE).  Since, compared to a non-dollarized economy a larger fall 
in investment is required, leverage sensitivity becomes more important. Therefore, the drop in 
investment in a HIQE is larger.  In fact, under our calibration, the subsequent larger response of 
output is enough to overcome the weaker financial accelerator effect. Therefore, improvements 
in institutional quality increase vulnerability to sudden stops with liability dollarization.   
2.5. Partial Dollarization - The Intermediate Case 
In this section, we derive the relationship between institutional quality and liability 
dollarization by allowing for borrowing in both local and foreign currency.  In the new economy, 
there are firms that borrow from abroad in foreign currency (Type 1) and firms that borrow 
domestically in local currency (Type 2).17 Since agents are risk neutral, they are indifferent 
between borrowing in domestic or foreign currency as long as the interest parity condition holds.  
The firms produce two types of intermediate goods that are aggregated to produce the final good.   
                                                 
17 Of course foreigners can also lend in local currency in foreign or domestic markets and lend in foreign currency in domestic 
markets.  Similarly, domestic lenders can lend in foreign currency in domestic markets.  What matters is the currency 
denomination of the loan, not the nationality of the lender.  See the empirical section of the paper.           
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( )( ) ddd tdtdt YYY ρρρ λλ /121 1−+=            (2.18) 
where, 2,1,1 == − iLKAY itititit αα .  Contracts with creditors differ by type of firm and yield:  
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 We assume a higher bankruptcy cost coefficient, *µ , for borrowing from abroad. In 
particular, we assume that there is a positive fixed wedge between the bankruptcy costs of 
domestic and foreign currency denominated loans equal to FC  such that FC+= µµ * . We 
explain later why this assumption is critical to derive the non-linear relationship between 
bankruptcy costs and vulnerability to sudden stops.  A significant number of papers (c.f. 
Iacoviello, Minetti, 2006; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Hermalin and Rose, 1999) argue that 
bankruptcy costs are higher for foreign lenders.  This difference is due to factors such as limited 
local experience and knowledge of foreign lenders, an inability to identify efficient borrowers 
due to a lack of a credit/relationship history, higher costs of additional information for foreign 
lenders , nationalistic bias in the legal system, and international capital flow barriers.  
Due to arbitrage, the returns to capital for the two firms are equal such that 
( ) 0211 =−− ktktt RRE . This condition also implies that the external finance premiums for the two 
types of firms are equal, and that they are indifferent between borrowing in domestic and foreign 
currency. However, the price of capital and leverage are different for each type of firm.  
( )[ ][ ] ( ) 2,1,0,0// 11 =>•Φ′=Φ′− −− iKIPQE ititwtitt         (2.19) 
 Liability dollarization is the proportion of borrowing in foreign currency: 
( )ttrttrtt BBsBsLD 211 / +=             (2.20) 
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where tLD  represents liability dollarization and ( ) rttttt sNKQB /11111 −= − , 
( )tttt NKQB 22122 −= −  are foreign and domestic currency borrowing, respectively. As before, the 
average bankruptcy cost as a percent of assets is set to 0.5, and average leverage is to set to 2.  
We further set liability dollarization to 39%, which matches Brazil’s average for the years 2000 
to 2006. 18  To obtain these values we set FC, µ , the share parameter, dγ  to 0.42, 0.2, and 0.41 
respectively. Calibrating the substitution parameter dρ  so that there is imperfect substitutability 
did not produce significant deviations from our results, therefore, 1=dρ .  In our simulations, we 
deviate from this baseline calibration by altering only the bankruptcy coefficient.  We then 
measure the response of output to foreign interest rate shocks for different values ofµ . 
An important characteristic of the non-stochastic steady state is the negative relationship 
between the bankruptcy cost coefficient and leverage. As expected, when bankruptcy costs fall 
firms reduce their leverage to counteract the effects on the external finance premium. In addition, 
as displayed in the left panel of Figure 3, we find that the relationship between the two variables 
is convex. The reason is that at high levels of bankruptcy costs, firms rely more on internal 
financing and reduce their chance of default significantly. The reduction in default probability 
decreases by more as external borrowing approaches zero. Furthermore, since, the marginal 
product of capital is higher at high levels of µ , the negative effect of an increase in bankruptcy 
costs on lenders expected return is counteracted by smaller drops in leverage.  
 As a consequence of this relationship between leverage and the bankruptcy cost 
coefficient, we find that higher bankruptcy costs correspond to higher liability dollarization. The 
                                                 
18 Data on lending in foreign currency was absent for Brazil. Nevertheless, we were able to obtain share of corporate borrowing 
that was funded by external resources from Banco Central do Brasil, Financial System Statistics. This average ratio in the 2000-
2006 period was equal to 38.8%. We should mention that we are omitting foreign currency lending by domestic institutions and 
domestic currency lending by foreign institutions by calibrating to this value. Alternatively, we considered the total foreign and 
domestic currency bonds/GDP ratios to proxy liability dollarization and calculated 40.5% share of foreign currency bonds in 
2001. Calibrating to this value did not change our results significantly. 
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right panel of Figure 4 depicts this positive relationship. The intuition is as follows: when 
bankruptcy costs are high, the difference between the leverage of the two types of firms is small 
despite the wedge, FC, and liability dollarization is relatively high. However, when bankruptcy 
costs are low, due to the convex relationship between µ  and leverage, the difference in 
bankruptcy costs, FC,  plays a more important role.  Specifically, the risk premium on domestic 
borrowing is much lower than on foreign borrowing, thus liability dollarization is relatively low. 
 Therefore, by calibrating to different levels of µ , we also set the level of dollarization in 
the economy, which in turn alters the relationship between vulnerability to sudden stops and 
recovery costs. Figure 4 shows the output responses to a 100 basis point positive shock to foreign 
interest rates for different values of µ . We can see from the bottom figure that for high values of 
µ  (low institutional quality), a reduction in µ  (an improvement in quality) increases the 
vulnerability to sudden stops.  For high values of µ , there is enough liability dollarization for the 
leverage sensitivity effect to dominate the financial accelerator effect.  A fall in µ , however, 
also results in less liability dollarization so that the financial accelerator effect becomes relatively 
more important.  In fact, below a certain value of µ , vulnerability to sudden stops starts to 
diminish, as depicted in the top panel.  Figure 5 summarizes this non-linear relationship between 
output responses and recovery costs.  We measure vulnerability to sudden stops with the 
maximum amplitude of the output response to a 100 annualized basis points increase in foreign 
interest rates.  If we further proxy institutional quality with recovery costs, the figure reveals an 
inverted U-Shaped relationship between institutional quality and vulnerability to sudden stops.   
2.6 Sensitivity Analysis 
In this section we check the sensitivity of our results to different parameter values. Figure 
6 displays the results. So far we have assumed that the central bank operates a flexible exchange 
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rate.  Under a fixed exchange rate, where *tt RR = , however, we no longer obtain an inverted U-
shaped curve, as depicted in the top panel of Figure 6. This is not surprising since Type 1 agents 
face the same contract as Type 2 when the exchange rate is fixed, notwithstanding the fixed cost 
wedge between the two bankruptcy costs. Therefore, the leverage sensitivity effect no longer 
dominates the financial accelerator effect when recovery costs are high, as leverage does not 
have to fall further to compensate for the depreciating currency. Furthermore, since interest rates 
are increased more aggressively under a fixed regime, the financial accelerator effect is amplified. 
Thus, we find that under a fixed exchange rate, improving institutions unambiguously reduces 
vulnerability to sudden stops.  Another noteworthy observation is that the benchmark Taylor rule 
does a better job of insulating the economy from external shocks for every value of µ .  
It has been shown that including habit persistence in standard RBC models significantly 
improves their ability to account for stylized facts (Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher, 2001). 
However, habit persistence is not included in the studies we referred to, and output responses of 
our model may be insignificant once we exclude this mechanism. As can be seen in the middle 
panel of Figure 6, shutting habit persistence off does not affect our results significantly. Output 
responses decrease at most by approximately 0.1 percent with this modification.   
We initially calibrated the fixed cost wedge parameter, FC, to match the level of 
dollarization in the economy.  This is an important parameter that determines the relative 
strength of the financial accelerator and leverage sensitivity effects.  Because we do not have an 
empirical estimate for this fixed cost, we calibrate FC to two other values and report the results 
in the bottom panel of Figure 6. As can been seen, when FC is smaller (larger), the U-Curve 
reaches its maximum at a smaller (larger) value of µ . This reflects a higher (lower) level of 
investment and borrowing by Type 1 agents and, therefore, a higher (lower) share of liability 
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dollarization. Since the higher (lower) level of liability dollarization increases (decreases) the 
strength of the leverage sensitivity effect, the turning point on the U-Shaped curve is observed 
for smaller (larger) values of µ . Also, the higher share of dollarization has an amplifying effect.  
3. Empirical Analysis 
 The model makes a number of predictions about the effects of the bankruptcy cost 
coefficient on liability dollarization, firm leverage, and the output loss following a sudden stop.  
In this section, we provide empirical evidence for these links.  The key variable in all these 
relationships is the bankruptcy cost coefficient.  The World Bank’s Doing Business database 
provides data on the recovery rate, defined as “how many cents on the dollar claimants (creditors, 
tax authorities, and employees) recover from an insolvent firm.”  In the model, this variable 
corresponds to one minus the bankruptcy cost coefficient.   
 Figure 3 depicts a negative relationship between the bankruptcy cost and firm leverage.  
We therefore test for a positive relationship between the recovery rate and firm leverage.   We 
estimate the following cross-sectional regression: 
 iii RECOVERYLEVERAGE εβα +⋅+=                   (3.1) 
where iLEVERAGE  is equal to the average leverage ratio of firms in each country for 2005- 
2007.  Data is from Mergent online.  Because the number of firms used to calculate the average 
varies by country, we estimate this model using weighted least squares.  Data for RECOVERY  
are for 2005 since some firms only report leverage for 2005.  Results are presented in Table 1.  
The coefficient of RECOVERY is significant at the 1% level and implies that a 1 percentage 
point increase in the recovery rate leads to a 0.57 percentage point increase in leverage.   
 We also provide evidence for the leverage sensitivity effect.  When recovery rates are 
high, creditors are less affected by bankruptcy and therefore leverage plays a small role 
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compared to the risk free rate in determining external finance rates.  Thus, the higher the 
recovery rate, the less sensitive is the external finance premium to firm leverage.  To test this 
implication of the model, we estimate the following model: 
iiiiii ControlsRECOVERYLEVERAGELEVERAGERISKPREM εδββα +⋅+⋅⋅+⋅+= 10       (3.2) 
The dependent variable is the “interest rate (%) charged by banks on loans to prime private 
sector customers minus the ‘risk free’ treasury bill interest rate at which short-term government 
securities are issued or traded in the market.”  To maximize the sample size, we take the average 
over the years 2005 to 2007 for each country since some countries only have data for a single 
year.  Data are obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and the 
Emerging Market Bond Spread (EMBS).  As a control variable, we include private credit 
provided by domestic banks and other financial institutions as a percent of the market 
capitalization of domestic firms (Collin-Dufresne, et al., 2001).  The results are given in Table 2.  
In both columns, the interaction term is negative and significant, implying that the effect of 
leverage on the risk premium is smaller in countries with higher recovery rates.  The coefficient, 
however, is rather small and implies that an increase in the recovery rate from 0% to 100% 
reduces the impact of leverage by only 0.4 percentage points.   
 The right panel of Figure 3 depicts a positive relationship between the bankruptcy cost 
and liability dollarization.  Equivalently, there is a positive relationship between the recovery 
rate and local currency borrowing.   Specifically, the model predicts that an increase in the 
recovery rate will increase both local currency and foreign currency lending, but that the former 
increases relative to the latter.  In the model, we make the assumption that all foreign borrowing 
is denominated in foreign currency, and all domestic borrowing is denominated in domestic 
currency.  In that case, liability dollarization and the proportion of firm borrowing from foreign 
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lenders are equivalent.  If that were the case, then to test this relationship we could estimate the 
effect of recovery rates on either variable.  The two, however, are not necessarily the same.  
While it is true that for most countries, foreign borrowing is denominated in foreign currency, 
there is greater variation in the degree to which bonds issued in domestic debt markets are 
denominated in local currency.19  Since it is ultimately the extent of local-currency-denominated 
debt that reduces currency risk, we focus on the effect of recovery rates on this variable, as 
opposed to the proportion of borrowing from foreign lenders.      
 To verify that higher recovery rates increase the size of local currency relative to foreign 
currency domestic bond markets, we estimate the following cross-sectional regression:  
 iiiii ControlsRECOVERYFCBGDPLCBGDP εδβα +⋅+⋅+=−         (3.3) 
LCBGDP and FCBGDP are the amount of local currency and foreign currency bonds 
outstanding as a percent of GDP, respectively.  Data are as of end-2001 and are taken from Table 
1 of Burger and Warnock (2006), who use unpublished BIS data supplemented with data from 
Bloomberg.  Local currency bonds are those issued by residents of a particular country in that 
country’s currency, regardless of whether it was placed in the domestic market or abroad.  For 
the overwhelming majority of countries, however, most local currency bonds are issued at home, 
which matches the assumption in the model.20   
 We also consider the percent of total bonds, including both those issued at home and 
abroad, that are denominated in domestic currency.  LCBSHARE gives the local currency share 
of total bonds.  This variable, however, does not capture local currency bond market 
development.  For example, two countries could have the same local currency share, but if one 
                                                 
19 Eichengreen et al. (2002) and Hausmann and Panizza (2003) find that most countries are unable to borrow from abroad in their 
own currency, regardless of macro policy or institutional quality, a phenomenon known as (external) original sin. Burger and 
Warnock (2006), however, find that both macro policy and institutional quality increase the size of local currency bond  markets.     
20 Even if this were not the case and foreign lenders provide local currency finance either from abroad or in domestic markets, 
LCBGDP still measures exposure to currency risk as it captures the ability to borrow in local currency.       
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has a larger local currency bond market relative to GDP and therefore relies less on foreign-
currency-denominated foreign borrowing, she is less vulnerable to an exchange rate depreciation. 
 Data for RECOVERY  are for 2003, while the dependent variable is taken as of end-2001.  
However, there is little time series variation in the recovery rate from 2003 to 2007, and so 2003 
data are most likely a good representation of earlier values for this variable.   
 Following Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003), we include as a control variable the dollar share 
of the minimum variance portfolio calculated over the previous five years (1996-2000).21  They  
argue that with strict interest parity, dollarization will be the result of the relative volatilities of 
the real exchange rate and inflation.  The share of dollar lending then becomes the proportion of 
dollar loans in the minimum variance portfolio (MVP).  We add trade as a percent of GDP to 
explain dollarization relative to the size of the economy.  It can be argued that dollarization is a 
natural consequence of increased trade and integration as exporters and importers require more 
foreign currency for their businesses, thus creating a need for dollar accounts. 
 Table 3 presents the results.  The coefficient of RECOVERY in the first column is large 
and significant, implying that a one percentage point increase in the recovery rate leads to a 0.6 
percentage point increase in the ratio of local currency bonds to GDP.   In the domestic context, 
therefore, original sin is a misnomer institutional quality can stimulate local currency bond 
market development (Jeanne, 2003).  The effect on foreign currency bonds is positive but smaller 
and less significant (p-value=0.109).  Not surprisingly, greater recovery rates increase local 
currency lending relative to foreign currency lending, confirming the predictions of the model.22  
In the fourth column, however, the coefficient of RECOVERY is positive but insignificant in 
predicting the local currency share (as opposed to when we scale by GDP, an increase in the 
                                                 
21 This is calculated as 100*[VAR(inflation) + COV(inflation, real exchange rate depreciation)] / [VAR(inflation) + VAR(real 
exchange rate depreciation) + 2COV(inflation, real exchange rate depreciation)]. 
22 We obtain similar results using the regressors in Burger and Warnock (2006).  
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local currency share implies a decrease in the foreign currency share).  As mentioned above, 
however, this variable is not necessarily a good measure of exposure to currency risk.         
 We also examine whether higher recovery rates increase local currency relative to foreign 
currency lending in the domestic banking system as opposed to the bond market.  We use the 
database constructed in Honig (2008b) which provides data on domestic banking system 
dollarization for the years 1998 to 2000.  Data are limited to emerging markets and developing 
nations.  In addition, data for foreign currency loans provided by domestic banks to domestic 
firms are far less available than foreign currency deposits in domestic banks.  In fact, using 
foreign currency credit as the dependent variable results in an insufficient number of 
observations.  We use foreign currency deposits instead as a proxy.  This is reasonable since 
banks typically match foreign currency deposits with foreign currency loans (Honohan and Shi, 
2003).  One reason is that there are often regulations in emerging market countries requiring 
banks to limit currency mismatches on their balance sheets (Calvo and Mishkin, 2003).  As a 
result, the median level of bank dollar mismatch, defined as dollar deposits minus dollar credit 
divided by total liabilities, is close to zero. We estimate the following cross-sectional regression: 
 iiiii ControlsRECOVERYFCDGDPLCDGDP εδβα +⋅+⋅+=−         (3.4) 
LCDGDP and FCDGDP are local currency deposits as a percent of GDP and foreign currency 
deposits as a percent of GDP, respectively.  As before, we scale by GDP to capture the 
development of local currency lending.  As an alternative dependent variable, we consider 
LCDSHARE, which is defined as local currency deposits as a percent of total deposits.  We take 
the average of the dependent variable from 1998 to 2000 to maximize the number of countries in 
the sample (data are often available for only one of the years but not the remaining two).     
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 Again, we include as controls the dollar share of the minimum variance portfolio, now 
calculated over the years 1993-1997, and the average ratio of trade to GDP calculated over the 
same period.  Because there may be restrictions that affect dollar deposits, we also include a 
variable that controls for the regulatory environment.  We construct a dummy variable based on 
the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions that indicates 
whether a country allows residents’ dollar deposit accounts with only minor restrictions as 
opposed to either severely restricting them or prohibiting them outright (Arteta, 2005). 
 The results are presented in Table 4.  As in the bond market, an increase in the recovery 
rate increases both local currency lending as a percent of GDP and local currency lending 
relative to foreign currency lending, scaled by GDP.  Unlike the bond market, however, there is a 
significant effect on local currency lending as a percent of total lending.  As in Ize and Levy-
Yeyati (2003), an increase in the dollar share of the minimum variance portfolio reduces local 
currency lending relative to GDP and to total deposits.  It also reduces local currency relative to 
foreign currency lending as a percent of GDP.  Allowing dollar deposits encourages deposit 
dollarization and therefore reduces the share of local currency deposits.  Finally, Figure 5 depicts 
an inverted U-shaped relationship between the recovery rate and the output loss following a 
sudden stop.  To test this prediction, we estimate the following cross-sectional regression:  
 iiiii ControlsRECOVERYRECOVERYGROWTHSS εδββα +⋅+⋅+⋅+= 221        (3.5) 
To classify observations as sudden stops, we follow the algorithm in Frankel and Cavallo (2004), 
updating their data through 2004.  A sudden stop occurs in year “t,” if the fall in the financial 
account surplus (from period “t-1”) of country “i” exceeds twice the standard deviation of the 
financial account surplus, the current account deficit falls by any amount either in “t” or in “t+1”, 
and GDP per capita falls by any amount either in “t” or in “t+1.”  A sudden stop is therefore a 
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large fall in net capital inflows (i.e. a reduction in the financial account surplus) that is 
accompanied by a reduction in the current account deficit and by a contraction in output.  The 
requirement that GDP per capita falls is necessary because in some cases, a decline in the 
financial account surplus may be the natural result of a positive terms of trade shock that 
provides an additional source of funding (Calvo et al., 2004).  More importantly, however, this 
restriction limits attention to costly sudden stops, which is of far greater interest.     
 To construct the dependent variable, we first take the average growth rate during the year 
of a sudden stop and the year after, which we define as a sudden stop episode.23  Including the 
year after the initial reversal in capital flows captures the fact that there can be and often is a 
lagged response of output.  It is also possible that sudden stops occur late in the year and 
therefore do not have sufficient time to affect GDP growth in the same year.  However, because 
data for recovery rates are taken from 2003 only, and because our sudden stop data begins in 
1982 and ends in 2004, we average GDP growth again over all sudden stop episodes during this 
sample period.  This results in one observation per country.  Of course recovery rates in 2003 
might not be a good proxy for earlier data.  However, the fact that there is little time series 
variation from 2003 to 2007 suggests that perhaps this is not a large issue.  For the control 
variables, we average over the sample period the values in the year before each sudden stop.  
 The regressors are standard in the empirical literature on sudden stops (c.f. Calvo, 2003; 
Calvo et al., 2002, 2004; Edwards, 2004; Frankel and Cavallo, 2004; Guidotti et al., 2004).  We 
follow Frankel and Cavallo (2004) and include the ratio of foreign liabilities of deposit money 
banks to M1, the ratio of trade to GDP, the log of reserves in months of imports, and the ratio of 
short-term debt to external debt.  Results were similar when we included the CA balance as a 
                                                 
23 This means that we include only countries that have experienced at least one sudden stop during the sample period.   
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percent of GDP, the log of real GDP per capita, the ratio of foreign direct investment to GDP, the 
ratio of public debt to GDP, and the external debt of the public and private sector. 
 Table 5 presents the results.  In the first column, we estimate equation (3.2) by OLS.  In 
the second column, we eliminate observations during sudden stop episodes in which growth is 
positive before we take the average over the sample period. 24   Because this censors the 
dependent variable above at zero, we estimate a Tobit model.  Both columns indicate an inverted 
U-shaped relationship between the recovery rate and ( 1) iGROWTHSS− ⋅  following a sudden 
stop.25   The coefficients are both individually and jointly significant,  Thus, beginning at low 
levels of the recovery rate, an increase in the rate initially increases the output loss during a 
sudden stop.  Eventually, however, the output loss begins to fall for higher values of the recovery 
rate.  Further calculations reveal that the hump in the relationship occurs at a recovery level of 
30.3, which is slightly less than the average of 36.7.  Therefore, for a significant number of 
countries, an increase in the recovery rate augments the output loss.26  Finally, in unreported 
regressions, we estimate the same model but use non-sudden stop episodes as a control group.  
The inverted U-shaped relationship does not hold in this sample. We find that trade openness 
reduces and greater share of short term debt augments the contractionary effect of sudden stops. 
The other variables have the expected sign but are insignificant.  The exception is external debt, 
which has a positive effect on growth.         
                                                 
24 In our definition of sudden stops, growth is required to be negative in year t or t+1.  Therefore, it is possible for there to be 
positive values of growth during sudden stops episodes.  As discussed above, this can occur if there is a lagged response of output 
to the capital flow reversal so that growth is still positive in year t of the sudden stop.    
25 Honig (2008a) finds a similar non-linear relationship between a more general institutional quality variable (an average of law 
and order, corruption, and bureaucracy quality) and the frequency of sudden stops.   
26 To test the mode’s implication that an increase in the recovery rate reduces the output loss during a sudden stop to the right of 
the hump by reducing liability dollarization, we could include local currency bond market development as a regressor.  If the 
hypothesis is correct, then controlling for this variable should eliminate the downward sloping part of the inverted U-shaped 
relationship and leave only the upward sloping part.  In other words, adding this variable should make the coefficient of 
RECOVERY2 insignificant.  When we include this variable, the quadratic term remains significant.  However, the addition of 
local currency bond market development shrinks the sample size to 14 countries.  In addition, the quadratic relationship can still 
hold if there are other effects of the recovery rate not included in the model that mitigate the fall in growth during a sudden stop. 
30 
 
4. Conclusion 
 Emerging market countries that have experienced initial improvements in institutional 
quality have in the process also become more vulnerable to sudden stops.  This result is 
surprising and breaks with the widespread literature on the benefits of good institutions.  
Advanced economies with strong institutions, on the other hand, do not suffer large drops in 
output during capital reversals.  These two observations imply a non-linear effect of institutional 
quality on the contractionary impact of sudden stops.  In this paper, we provide a theoretical 
explanation for this relationship using a DSGE model for a small open economy.   To derive this 
relationship, we first analyze the direct effects of an improvement in institutional quality.  A 
reduction in the bankruptcy cost coefficient, our indicator of institutional quality, weakens the 
financial accelerator effect during a sudden stop, leading to a smaller drop in output.  However, 
lower bankruptcy costs also reduce the sensitivity of the external finance premium to leverage, 
requiring a larger fall investment in response to a capital reversal.  This leverage sensitivity 
effect plays a critical role in the model, and we provide empirical evidence that it exists.   We 
then show that the relative strengths of these two effects depend on the level of liability 
dollarization.  When liabilities are heavily dollarized, the second effect dominates, so that lower 
bankruptcy costs actually magnify the output loss during sudden stops.   
 When we further model a causal effect of bankruptcy costs on liability dollarization, 
which we verify empirically, simulations yield an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
institutional quality and the negative of growth during sudden stops.   Finally, empirical evidence 
from sudden stop episodes over a 23 year period also reveal the non-linear effect.  Thus we 
demonstrate both theoretically and empirically that the effect of institutional improvement on 
risk is ambiguous and depends on the initial level of institutional quality.     
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Table 1: Equation 3.1 - Leverage and the Recovery Rate
Dependent variable: LEVERAGE
RECOVERY 0.567
(5.53)***
Obs., Countries 45
R2 0.42
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Notes: Cross-section regression estimated by Weighted Least Squares (WLS) where the weight is based on the number of firms in each
country that is used to calculate the average leverage ratio. LEVERAGE = average leverage ratio of firms in each country for the years 2005
to 2007. RECOVERY (2003) - how many cents on the dollar claimants (creditors, tax authorities, and employees) recover from an insolvent
firm. Robust t-statistics in parentheses.
 
Table 2: Equation 3.2 - Leverage Sensitivity Effect
Dependent variable: RISKPREM RISKPREM
LEVERAGE 0.245 0.245
(1.680) (1.680)
LEVERAGE*RECOVERY -0.003 -0.004
(2.70)** (2.83)***
Private Credit / 0.000
Market Capitalization (0.080)
Obs., Countries 34 33
R2 0.28 0.32
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Notes: Cross-section regressions estimated by Weighted Least Squares (WLS). RISKPREM - interest rate (%) charged by banks on loans
to prime private sector customers minus the ‘risk free’ treasury bill interest rate at which short-term government securities are issued or
traded in the market; average 2005 to 2007. LEVERAGE = average leverage ratio of firms in each country for the years 2005 to 2007.
RECOVERY - how many cents on the dollar claimants (creditors, tax authorities, and employees) recover from an insolvent firm; average
2005 to 2007. Private Credit / Market Capitalization - private credit provided by domestic banks and other financial institutions as a
percent of the market capitalization of domestic firms. Robust t-statistics in parentheses.
 
Table 3: Equation 3.3 - The Recovery Rate and Local Currency Borrowing in the Domestic Bond Market 
Dependent variable: LCBGDP FCBGDP LCBGDP-FCBGDP LCBSHARE
RECOVERY 0.619 0.108 0.510 0.050
(3.19)*** (1.640) (2.41)** (0.430)
Dollar Share MVP -0.097 -0.043 -0.054 -0.187
(1996-2000) (0.460) (0.860) (0.220) (1.230)
Trade % of GDP -0.017 0.042 -0.059 -0.041
(1996-2000) (0.120) (1.130) (0.420) (0.710)
Obs., Countries 45 45 45 45
R2 0.20 0.14 0.13 0.09
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Notes: Cross-section regressions estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). LCBGDP (end-2001) - local currency bonds % of GDP.
FCBGDP (end-2001) - foreign currency bonds % of GDP. LCBSHARE (end-2001) - local currency bonds % of total bonds. RECOVERY 
(2003) - how many cents on the dollar claimants (creditors, tax authorities, and employees) recover from an insolvent firm. Dollar Share
MVP - dollar share of the minimum variance portfolio (Ize and Levy-Yeyati, 2003). Robust t-statistics in parentheses.
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Table 4: Equation 3.4 - The Recovery Rate and Local Currency Borrowing in the Domestic Banking System
Dependent variable: LCDGDP FCDGDP LCDGDP - FCDGDP LCDSHARE
RECOVERY 0.264 -0.082 0.346 0.310
(1.92)* (1.030) (2.64)** (2.11)**
Dollar Share MVP -0.165 -0.024 -0.141 -0.199
(1993-1997) (3.65)*** (0.610) (3.66)*** (3.56)***
FC Deposits Allowed -3.979 5.044 -9.023 -10.695
(1993-1997) (0.640) (2.21)** (1.420) (1.98)*
Trade % of GDP 0.105 0.095 0.010 -0.064
(1993-1997) (1.120) (1.140) (0.120) (0.690)
Obs., Countries 64 64 64 64
R2 0.28 0.10 0.29 0.29
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Notes: Cross-section regressions estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). LCDGDP (avg. 1998-2000) - local currency deposits % of
GDP. FCDGDP (avg. 1998-2000) - foreign currency deposits % of GDP. LCDSHARE (avg. 1998-2000) - local currency deposits % of
total deposits. RECOVERY (2003) - how many cents on the dollar claimants (creditors, tax authorities, and employees) recover from an
insolvent firm. Dollar Share MVP - dollar share of the minimum variance portfolio (Ize and Levy-Yeyati, 2003). FC Deposits Allowed -
foreign currency deposits allowed (Arteta, 2005). Robust t-statistics in parentheses.
 
Table 5: Equation 3.5 - Growth during a sudden stop episode
Dependent variable: GROWTHSS
OLS Tobit (censored above at 0)a
RECOVERY -0.242 -0.276
(2.37)** (2.40)**
RECOVERY 2 0.004 0.004
(2.00)* (2.12)**
Foreign liabilities/ -0.001 -0.001
M1 (%) (1.230) (1.190)
Trade/GDP (%) 0.052 0.052
(2.83)*** (2.82)***
log total reserves 0.585 0.685
months of imports (1.050) (1.270)
External debt 0.018 0.016
/GDP (%) (1.73)* (1.370)
Short-term debt -0.120 -0.127
/total external debt (%) (2.77)** (2.98)***
Obs., Countries 32 32
F test for RECOVERY b 0.04 0.02
R 2 0.50 n.a.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
a Individual growth rates during sudden stops are censored above at zero before the average is taken.
b p-value for joint significance of RECOVERY and RECOVERY 2
Notes: Cross-country regression. GROWTHSS - Average over 1982 to 2004 of the average growth rate during year t and t+1 of a sudden
stop. RECOVERY (2003) - how many cents on the dollar claimants (creditors, tax authorities, and employees) recover from an insolvent
firm. Private Credit / Market Capitalization - private credit provided by domestic banks and other financial institutions as a percent of the
market capitalization of domestic firms. Robust t-statistics in parentheses.
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Figure 1: Impulse Responses to a 100 Annualized Basis Point Increase in Foreign Interest Rates 
(Benchmark Model) 
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Figure 2:  Impulse Responses to a Annualized 100 Basis Point Increase in Foreign Interest Rates  
(Liability Dollarized Economy) 
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Figure 3: Steady State Relationship between Leverage, Bankrup.Costs & Liability Dollar. 
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Figure 4: Output Responses to a 100 basis point positive Shock to Foreign Interest Rates  
(For Different Levels of the Bankruptcy Cost Coefficient) 
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Figure 5: Relationship between Vulnerability to Sudden Stops and Bankruptcy Costs (*) 
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(*) Vulnerability to Sudden Stops represents the maximum amplitude of the negative output response to a 100 
basis point increase in foreign interest rates corresponding to the level of each bankruptcy cost coefficient. 
 
Figure 6: Sensitivity Analysis 
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(*) Vulnerability to Sudden Stops represents the maximum amplitude of the negative output response to a 100 
basis point increase in foreign interest rates corresponding to the level of each bankruptcy cost coefficient.  
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Appendix A:  The Rest of the Model 
Aggregate production function is given by, αα −= 1tttt LKAY , where the labor input 
( ) ( ) ωω −= 1ethtt LLL  is a composite of household’s and entrepreneurs labor supply. This 
modification is needed to provide some net worth to entrepreneurs that start producing for the 
first time. In our simulations ω is set equal to 0.05 and entrepreneurs’ labor supply decision does 
not affect output significantly. The following sections describe the agents in the economy.  
A.1 Households 
 Households consume a composite good, tC ; a CES aggregation of domestic and foreign 
goods, HtC and 
F
tC respectively, where, 
H
tC  is a composite of the goods sold by the retailers. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1 11
1
1
p
p
p
p pp
p
p
H F
t t tC C Cγ γ
−
−
−⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
                      (A.1) 
The corresponding price index is given by, ( )( ) ( )( ) 11 1 11p p pH Ft t tP P Pγ γ− − −⎡ ⎤= + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . Households 
exhibit habit formation and maximize, 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −−+Ω−−∑
∞
=
+++
Ω−
−++
0
1
1 1ln/ln1/
i
h
ititititit
i
t LkPMxbCCE β                      (A.2) 
s.t ( ) ( ) tttttththtttttttttt PDsDMLWTPDsRDRMC Π++++=++++++ −−−−− //)1()1( *1* 1* 111   (A.3) 
 Consumers buy goods, hold money, tM , pay lump sum taxes, tT . Their income comes 
from wages, profits received from the retailers, tΠ , the returns on deposits, and their money 
holdings. Furthermore, consumers can borrow in terms of foreign currency at the risk free 
interest rate *tR  , or in domestic currency at an interest rate tR .  Nominal foreign and domestic 
debt payments are denoted by ( ) 111 −−+ tt DR and ( ) 1* 11 −−+ ttt DsR  respectively, and ts represents the 
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exchange rate. Given this setup, the first order conditions are derived from the consumer’s 
optimization problem. Consumption allocation and intertemporal efficiency: 
1
pH H
t t
F F
t t
C P
C P
γ
γ
−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟− ⎝ ⎠
                         (A.4) 
h
tt
h
t
t L
k
P
W
−= 1
1λ               (A.5) 
marginal utility of consumption and intermtemporal efficiency: 
( ) ( )1 1t t t t tC bC b C bCλ β−Ω −Ω− += − − −            (A.6) 
( )( )11 /1 ++ += tttttt PPRE λβλ                (A.7) 
uncovered interest parity condition, law of one price, and foreign demand for home goods is: 
0)1()1( 1*
1
1 =⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−+ +
+
+
t
t
tt
t
t
tt s
s
RR
P
P
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*H
tt
H
t PsP = ,   *FttFt PsP =                         (A.9) 
*
* *
*
H
H t
t t
t
PC Y
P
ε−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
            (A.10) 
where *FtP
*H
tP , are the foreign price of home and foreign goods and 
*F
tP =1 in every period. 
*
tY  
is foreign income, and the foreign aggregate price level *tP is exogenously determined. 
A.2 Entrepreneurs 
 Wholesale firms are managed by entrepreneurs and produce according to: 
1
it t it itY A K L
α α−=              (A.11) 
where tA  is an i.i.d. aggregate productivity shock. Capital expenditures are financed by banks 
and the entrepreneurs’ net worth such that, 
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1t it it itQ K N B− = +              (A.12) 
where itN  is the net worth of the firm at the end of period t-1 and at the beginning of period t, 
itB denotes the funds borrowed from the banks, and 1tQ −  is the price of assets in period t-1. In the 
benchmark model we assume that households’ domestic deposits equal the aggregate borrowing 
requirement of the entrepreneurs such that ttt PDB /= . In addition to the economy wide 
technology shock, entrepreneurs face idiosyncratic, iid, returns to capital shocks, itA . Real 
returns to capital are composed of itA  and the real return, averaged across firms,
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w
tP  is the price of the wholesale good, and tP  is the price level. Firms hire labor according to: 
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where wttt PP /=η  and tη/1 represents the relative price of wholesale goods. 
A.3   Capital Producers 
There are increasing marginal costs to capital production. The capital stock evolves according to: 
( ) ( ) ttttt KKKIK δ−+Φ=+ 1/1                                     (A.15) 
Capital producers are perfectly competitive. They use wholesale goods as inputs to produce 
capital according to the production function: ( )/t t tI K KΦ . The price of capital goods is derived 
from the producers’ profit maximization problem. The final component of the accelerator 
mechanism is given by equation (A.16).  
( )[ ][ ] 0/'/ 11 =Φ− −− ttwttt KIPQE     ( ) 0' >•Φ         (A.16) 
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If entrepreneurs experience a positive asset price shock, they borrow more and demand more 
capital. This leads to an increase in their expected net worth for the following period.  In addition, 
as investment increases, there is upward pressure on asset prices, amplifying the initial response. 
A.4   Retail Firms 
 Retail firms are monopolistically competitive. They buy wholesale goods and sell them 
after repackaging at no resource cost. The purpose of including these firms at this stage is to have 
a simple contract between the firm and the banking sector.27 The other benefit of this framework 
is that it allows for sticky prices and therefore monetary policy that is not neutral in the short run. 
The demand for goods produced by retail firms is given by, 
( ) ( )HtH Ht tH
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P
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where ( )
1 11
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t tY Y z dz
ν
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υ
υ− −⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫ . Following the pricing scheme of Calvo (1983), we assume that 
only θ fraction of retailers adjust their prices at a specific time.  
( ) ( )1*1 1H H Ht t tP P Pθ θ−− −=             (A.18) 
Retailers maximize an intertemporal loss function and set their optimal 
price
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= ∏ , where 1 1/ (1 1/ )µ ν= −   is the desired gross mark up over wholesale 
prices. Given this setup, one can solve for the domestic inflation rate as, 
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where the first term is retailers’ marginal cost, and the second term is the expected inflation rate.  
A.5   Central Bank and the Government 
                                                 
27 A financial contract with a monopolistically competitive firm would complicate aggregation due to the different levels of 
leverage for each monopolistic firm. 
43 
 
 The central bank follows a Taylor rule, and sets interest rates to stabilize output and 
inflation rates around their target values: 
 ( )( ) ( )[ ] ττγγ π 111 //1 −−−+= tsstHtttsst RYYPPrrR y                       (A.20) 
The last item on the right hand side is the interest rate smoothing term. sstY and rr
ss are the steady 
state levels of output and the real interest rate respectively. 
A.6   Closing the Model 
 To close the model, we assume that the government finances its expenditures by printing 
money and collecting lump sum taxes, and the resource constraint in the economy holds: 
( ) ttttt TPMMG +−= − /1                                    (A.21) 
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where eHtC is entrepreneurial consumption, and tt
k
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⎛ ∫ δµ are the total 
bankruptcy costs. Finally, we obtain the balance of payments condition in the economy by 
adding consumers’ and entrepreneurs’ budget constraints: 
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Appendix B: Variables and Data Sources 
Variable   Description and Source 
RECOVERY  The recovery rate is recorded as cents on the dollar recouped by creditors through the
bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings. The calculation takes into account whether the business
emerges from the proceedings as a going concern as well as costs and the loss in value due to
the time spent closing down. If the business keeps operating, no value is lost on the initial claim,
set at 100 cents on the dollar. If it does not, the initial 100 cents on the dollar are reduced to 70
cents on the dollar. Then the official costs of the insolvency procedure are deducted (1 cent for
each percentage of the initial value). Finally, the value lost as a result of the time the money
remains tied up in insolvency proceedings is taken into account, including the loss of value due
to depreciation of the hotel furniture. Consistent with international accounting practice, the
depreciation rate for furniture is taken to be 20%. The furniture is assumed to account for a
quarter of the total value of assets. The recovery rate is the present value of the remaining
proceeds, based on end-2006 lending rates from the IMF’s IFS, supplemented with data from
central banks. Source:World Bank Doing Business database. 
Leverage Regressions   
Leverage ratio  Source: Mergent online.  
Risk premium on lending  Risk premium on lending is the interest rate charged by banks on loans to prime private sector
customers minus the risk free treasury bill interest rate at which short-term government
securities are issued or traded in the market. In some countries this spread may be negative,
indicating that the market considers its best corporate clients to be lower risk than the
government. Source: WDI. 
Emerging Market Bond Spread  Source: JP Morgan EMBI. 
Market Capitalization  Market capitalization (also known as market value) is the share price times the number of shares
outstanding. Listed domestic companies are the domestically incorporated companies listed on
the country's stock exchanges at the end of the year. Listed companies do not include investment
companies, mutual funds, or other collective investment vehicles. Data are in current U.S.
dollars. S&P, Emerging Stock Markets Factbook and supplemental S&P data. Source: WDI. 
Private Credit  Private credit provided by banks and other financial institutions. Source: IFS 22d+42d.   
Banking System Dollarization Variables   
Local currency deposits  Local currency deposits of residents held in domestic banks. Source: IMF Country Reports. 
Foreign currency deposits  Foreign currency deposits of residents held in domestic banks. Source: IMF Country Reports. 
Total deposits  Total deposits in domestic banks. Source: IMF Country Reports. 
Foreign currency deposits allowed  IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. 
Local Currency Bond Market Variables   
LCBGDP and FCBGDP  Local currency bonds as a percent of GDP (both in $). Local currency bonds are those issued by
residents of a particular country (for example, Chile) in that country’s currency (Chilean pesos),
regardless of whether it was placed in the domestic market or offshore. Source: Burger and
Warnock (2006), Table 1. All data are as of end-2001. Data are from security-level data
underlying BIS Table 14B (International Bonds and Notes by Country of Residence) and the
unpublished long-term debt component of BIS Table 16A (Domestic Debt Securities). Local-
currency-denominated debt is the sum of domestic long-term debt (from Table 16A) and the
local currency portion of Table 14B. Domestic long-term debt for countries not available on
Table 16A and data for Brady bonds are from Merrill Lynch (2002). Included in total bonds is
$2.5 trillion of foreign currency bonds, denominated primarily in dollars, Euros, and sterling. 
LCBSHARE  The ratio of local currency to total bonds (%). Source:Burger,Warnock (2006). 
Budget Surplus% GDP(average 1982-2000)  Central government budget surplus (% of GDP). Source: IFS v80. 
Growth real GDP (average 1991 to 2000)  GDP growth (annual %). Source: WDI. NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG 
Inflation Variance  Annual percent change in consumer price index. Source: WDI. 
log real GDP per capita  Log of GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$). Source: WDI. 
Sudden Stop Variables   
Financial Account 
 
Net sum of direct investment (78bdd+78bed), portfolio investment (78bfd + 78bgd), financial 
derivatives(78bwd + 78bxd), and other investment(78bhd + 78bid).Source:IFS 78bjd.  
Trade (% of GDP)   Exports plus Imports divided by GDP. Source: IFS and WDI. 
Foreign Liabilities/M1 (%)  Foreign Liabilities of Deposit Money Banks/M1 (%). Source: IFS 26c/34. 
Current Account (% of GDP)  Current Account Balance as % of GDP. Source: IFS and WDI. 
Log of Total Reserves in Months of Imports  This item shows reserves expressed in terms of the number of months of imports of goods and 
services which could be paid for. Source: WDI. 
FDI (% of GDP)  Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP). Source: IFS and WDI. 
Government Debt (% of GDP)  Central government debt, total (% of GDP). Source: WDI. 
External Debt (% of GDP)  External debt, total (DOD, current US$) % of GDP: Total external debt is debt owed to 
nonresidents repayable in foreign currency, goods, or services. Total external debt is the sum of 
public, publicly guaranteed, and private nonguaranteed long-term debt, use of IMF credit, and 
short-term debt. Short-term debt includes all debt having an original maturity of one year or less 
and interest in arrears on long-term debt. Data are in current U.S. dollars.Source:WDI. 
Short term debt (% of total external debt)  Short-term debt (% of total external debt): Short-term debt includes all debt having an original 
maturity of one year or less and interest in arrears on long-term debt. Source: WDI. 
 
